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Abstract
Aggregating individuals’ consistent attitudes might produce inconsistent collective
attitudes. Some groups therefore need the capacity to form attitudes that are
irreducible to those of their members. Such groups, group-agent realists argue, are
agents in control of their own attitude formation. In this paper, however, I show how
group-agent realism overlooks the important fact that groups consist of strategically
interacting agents. Only by eliminating group agency from our social explanations can
we see how individuals vote strategically to gain control of their groups and produce
collective attitudes we cannot make sense of if we treat groups as agents.
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1. Introduction
Explaining how certain groups function, group-agent realists argue, requires us to
interpret them as agents in their own right (Tollefsen 2002a, 2002b, 2015; List and
Pettit 2011).1 Group-agent realism is thus a rejection of the eliminativist view of group
agency as at most a metaphorical shorthand and unhelpful for understanding groups’
place in the social world. Like eliminativists, the group-agent realists I focus on accept
the individualist view that there are no psychologically mysterious forces to be
accounted for in explanations of social phenomena. Groups are nothing more
than individuals organised in accordance with a certain structure (List and Pettit
2011: 4–6). They nonetheless argue that we need to treat certain groups as agents
in their own right to fully understanding how they function.
In this paper, I explore group-agent realism and consider whether it offers an
approach to explaining groups’ behaviour that is superior to that of its
eliminativist rival. As I go into in section 2, group-agent realism is based on an
interpretational account of agency, on which a system, or object, is an agent as
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1List and Pettit develop their group-agent realism in several works, but their most comprehensive account
is List and Pettit (2011).
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long as we can best interpret its behaviour by viewing it as an agent capable of
rationally forming and acting on its own attitudes. Groups are agents, then,
insofar as their behavioural patterns can reliably be interpreted by treating them
as agents.
The paper’s main purpose is to demonstrate why we cannot expect group
members to behave in the way required for groups to function in this manner. I
show how group-agent realism and its corresponding rejection of eliminativism
rest on an implausible account of individual agency. The eliminativist approach,
on the other hand, allows for a more plausible view of how individuals behave
within the group structure. Only on this view can we appreciate how groups
themselves consist of strategically interacting agents. I show how group members
behave strategically to make their groups function in ways that will make no
sense to us if we treat the groups themselves as agents. By fully appreciating the
implications of groups being constituted by intentional agents, therefore, we
shall see why group-agent realism fails.
In section 3, I start exploring developments in social choice theory over the last
two decades that have strengthened the case for group-agent realism. By aggregating
individual group members’ consistent attitudes towards a set of logically
interconnected propositions, we might get inconsistent collective attitudes. For
example, there might be majority support for p and q separately but not for ‘p ∧ q’
conjunctively. In cases of such inconsistency, groups need the capacity to select only
some of their members’ attitudes and adopt whatever attitudes follow whether the
members endorse them or not. To adopt p and q separately, a group must also
adopt ‘p ∧ q’ conjunctively even when there is majority opposition to this
proposition.
This is a cognitive process, Christian List and Philip Pettit argue, in which the
group reflects on the inputs from its members and forms its own attitudes, which
might be irreducible to those of its members. I show in section 4 how List and Pettit
understand this process to force an autonomous group mind into existence, as the
content of group attitudes is in part determined by which decision procedure the
group applies, and not just by individuals’ attitudes. Crucially, two groups whose
members hold identical attitudes can therefore form different attitudes (List and
Pettit 2011: 66). We therefore cannot make sense of how groups function
by treating them as mere collections of individuals, group-agent realists argue.
We must instead see them as agents in their own right. Group agency is
consequently non-redundant in social explanations (List and Pettit 2011: 6–10).
I begin developing my objection to group-agent realism in section 5, where I first
present the necessary conditions for the collective-level inconsistency on which
group-agent realism relies. Crucially, one such condition is that group members
vote sincerely. I show, however, why we can expect group members to vote strategically
to make sure their group forms attitudes consistent with their preferences. By
misrepresenting their attitudes towards some propositions on the agenda, the group
members can make their group adopt a set of attitudes consistent with their own
attitudes towards the propositions most important to them. By such strategic voting,
individuals can make the process from which List and Pettit believe group agency
emerges irrelevant. Group attitudes are then determined by individuals’ preferences,
not by their group’s correction mechanism.
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The importance of group members’ sincerity for group-agent realism is further
illuminated by the observation that it can lead groups to form false judgements. By
strategically misrepresenting their beliefs, individuals can make their group form
judgements they know to be false. As I show in section 6, this causes problems
for the view of groups as rational agents whose beliefs are generally true
(Tollefsen 2002a, 2002b; List and Pettit 2011: 24, 36–7). This view is unsuited
for making sense of false collective judgement formation resulting from strategic
voting. To understand this phenomenon, we must descend to the individual level.
Sections 5 and 6 thus show how strategic voting is a problem for group-agent
realism. In sections 7 and 8, I explore possible solutions to this problem by
considering how truthful voting can be made incentive-compatible. In section 7,
I show how familiar social choice results imply that no collective decision
procedure can ensure this outcome. I therefore move on to consider the two
ways in which List and Pettit (2011: Ch. 5) suggest group members can be made
to prefer sincerity. As List and Pettit themselves seem to admit, however, neither
of these solutions can be expected to work if implemented.
I therefore conclude that group-agent realism depends on assumptions about
individual behaviour that we cannot expect to hold when we seek to explain real
social phenomena. We are therefore better off eliminating group agency and
focusing on individual agency.
2. Group-agent realism
Group-agent realism is the view that groups can form attitudes that are irreducible
to those of their human members, and thus be agents with their own minds. Group
agency is therefore distinct from the idea of ‘shared agency’, associated particularly
with Michael Bratman (1999: pt. 2; 2014), where a shared intention is understood as
a state of affairs where individuals hold the same intention to perform an action
together. As Bratman (1999: 111) notes, such an intention is not attributed to a
‘superagent’. The mental states occur only in individuals’ minds. Group-agent
realists, on the other hand, do attribute mental states to a superagent, or group
agent.2 Certain groups, such as political parties, multi-member courts, legislatures,
expert committees, commercial corporations, and tenure committees, they argue,
have their own attitudes, and should therefore be understood as agents.
Group-agent realism rests on a functionalist theory of mind that understands a
system to possess a mind on the basis of how it functions rather than its physical
composition (List and Pettit 2011: 28; Tollefsen 2015: 68–9). Two systems with
entirely different physical components can therefore both possess a mind insofar
as their parts perform the same function. If a physical event, a, in one system
performs the same function as a physical event, b, in a different system, then a
and b are functionally analogous. If some human action, a, within the group
structure performs the same function in this structure as some physical event, b,
in the human brain does with respect to the human mind, then a and b are
2For further elaboration on the distinction between group agency and shared, or joint, agency, see Pettit
and Schweikard (2006) and Tollefsen (2015: Ch. 2).
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functionally analogous. We may then say that b is a function of a human mind and a
is a function of a group mind. This is how a group and a human can both be
understood to have a mind despite the differences in their physical make-ups.
The group-agent realists I focus on lean on a particular functionalist theory of
mind and agency by taking Daniel Dennett’s (1971, 1987, 1991) intentional strategy
towards groups to explain their behaviour (List and Pettit 2011: Intro., Ch. 1;
Tollefsen 2002a, 2002b, 2015: Ch. 5). On this approach, a system is an agent
insofar as we can best interpret its behaviour from the ‘intentional stance’, from
which we treat the system as an agent and predict its behaviour based on the
beliefs and desires it rationally ought to have. We assume that the system is
rational and capable of forming its own mental states in response to its
environment and of acting accordingly. We take the system to act in accordance
with a pattern of generally true and consistent beliefs. If this intentional strategy
proves to reliably detect such a predictive pattern, the system is an agent.
According to group-agent realism, we fail to detect such patterns at the collective
level, and therefore miss out on a powerful way of explaining and predicting groups’
behaviour, if we see groups as collections of individuals rather than agents in their
own right.
Taking the eliminativist approach to group agency is to take the ‘physical stance’
towards groups. From the physical stance, Dennett explains, we expect behaviour in
accordance with the system’s physical constitution. Taking the physical stance
towards groups, then, means interpreting them by looking at their physical
components – that is, their human members. As List and Pettit (2011: 6) note,
their approach towards groups ‘parallels the move from taking a ‘physical stance’
towards a given system to taking an ‘intentional stance’’ (see also List 2019:
155). Seeing groups from the physical stance as mere collections of individuals,
they argue, will prevent us from understanding their behaviour.
List and Pettit (2011: 36–7) identify three kinds of standard of rationality a
system must satisfy to be interpretable from the intentional stance, and thus
qualify as an agent. First, ‘attitude-to-action’ standards require that a group
member can act on the group’s behalf. Although important, I shall not focus on
these standards here. I devote my attention to the other two kinds of standard.
The ‘attitude-to-attitude’ standards require that the group forms consistent
attitudes. These standards are at the centre of the discussion in the next three
sections, where the focus is on groups’ capacity to form consistent attitudes that
are irreducible to their members’ attitudes. Finally, the ‘attitude-to-fact’
standards require the group to reliably form true beliefs based on accessible
evidence. I turn to these standards in section 6, where I reveal a problem for
groups’ ability to form true beliefs.
3. Attitude aggregation
An important step in the argument for group-agent realism is showing why
satisfying the attitude-to-attitude standards of rationality requires groups to form
attitudes that are irreducible to those of their members. For a group to form
consistent attitudes – that is, none of its attitudes logically precludes another – it
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might have to adopt attitudes only a minority, or even none, of its members hold.
This is why group-agent realists see the need to attribute agency to groups
themselves in order to explain their behaviour; such explanation is impossible if
we only look at individuals’ attitudes.
To understand how groups can form attitudes that are irreducible to those of
their members, let us first take collective beliefs or desires to be formed by
aggregating group members’ binary judgements or preferences, respectively, towards
some proposition, p. That is, individuals express a belief that p or not p, or a desire
for p or not p. The set of propositions the group members make collective attitudes
towards is called the agenda. The agenda is simple if the propositions are not
logically interconnected, so that an attitude towards any proposition is not implied
by attitudes towards other propositions. The agenda is non-simple when the
propositions are logically interconnected. Logical connectives, such as ¬ (not), ∧
(and), ∨ (or), → (implies), or ↔ (if and only if), tie the propositions on the non-
simple agenda together. For example, ‘p → q’ connects p and q, and so does ‘p ∧ q’.
An agenda with the two propositions p and q is therefore simple, but we make it
non-simple by adding a connecting proposition, such as ‘p → q’.
The group can obviously form consistent attitudes reliably reducible to its
members’ attitudes when the agenda is simple. But a crucial step in the argument
for non-redundant group agency is to show why this is not the case if the agenda is
non-simple (List and Pettit 2002). On a non-simple agenda, if a system judges that
p is the case and that ‘p → q’, we expect it to judge that also q is the case.
However, aggregating individuals’ complete and consistent judgements of connected
propositions might deliver inconsistent collective judgements.3
More precisely, such results may occur in groups where three or more members
take part in determining the collective judgements. Let us assume that three group
members submit complete and consistent judgements on a non-simple agenda
consisting of the three propositions p, ‘p → q’, and q. But as we see in Table 1, a
majority of group members judge that p and ‘p→ q’ are both true but that q is false.
List and Pettit (2002) prove the general result that no non-dictatorial aggregation
function that forms collective attitudes towards the propositions on a non-simple
agenda can satisfy the following four conditions (quoted from List and Pettit
2011: 49):
Table 1. A group of three members governed by the majority makes inconsistent judgements of three
interconnected propositions
p p → q q
Member A True True True
Member B True False False
Member C False True False
Majority True True False
3An individual’s attitudes are complete when the individual expresses an attitude towards each of the
propositions on the agenda.
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Universal domain. The aggregation function admits as input any possible
profile of individual attitudes towards the propositions on the agenda,
assuming that individual attitudes are consistent and complete.4
Collective rationality. The aggregation function produces as output consistent
and complete group attitudes towards the propositions on the agenda.
Anonymity. All individuals’ attitudes are given equal weight in determining
the group attitudes. Formally, the aggregation function is invariant under
permutations of any given profile of individual attitudes.
Systematicity. The group attitude on each proposition depends only on the
individuals’ attitudes towards it, not on their attitudes towards other
propositions, and the pattern of dependence between individual and
collective attitudes is the same for all propositions.
In summary, a non-dictatorial aggregation function cannot both make complete
and consistent attitudes and be equally responsive to each group member’s
attitudes whatever they might be. Pettit (2001: 272) therefore refers to this
problem as a dilemma. And he calls it a ‘discursive dilemma’ because it involves
individuals coming together to form collective attitudes. A solution to the
discursive dilemma must weaken one of the four conditions.
One solution is to relax collective rationality by allowing for either incomplete
or inconsistent attitude-formation. While relaxing the consistency requirement
will lead to obvious problems for the group’s ability to operate properly, we
might consider weakening completeness by introducing a super-majoritarian
voting rule. If the group members vote on k propositions, a super-majority
greater than (k−1)/k is guaranteed to deliver consistent judgements (List and Pettit
2002: 106). So, if there are three propositions, a super-majority of more than two-
thirds will ensure consistency. With four propositions, the required supermajority is
more than three-quarters, and so on. But by weakening collective rationality, this
aggregation function will make the group unable to form attitudes whenever
there is no required super-majority either for or against a proposition. Since this
means the group will frequently fail to form an attitude, List and Pettit dismiss
this solution.
They also consider weakening universal domain by requiring that group
members’ attitudes be single-peaked (List and Pettit 2011: 52). If the individuals
can be ordered from left to right along a spectrum so that, for any proposition
on the agenda, those accepting the proposition are exclusively to the left or to
the right of those rejecting it, majority attitudes will correspond with the median
individual, whose attitudes, as we have assumed, are complete and consistent
(List 2003). This obviously means the group’s attitudes will be reducible to those
of its members. List and Pettit note, however, that even after deliberation and
even in relatively conformist groups, like expert panels, we have no good reason
to expect the group members’ attitudes to fall into such unidimensional
alignment. This is therefore no reliable solution.
4‘Profile’ refers to the n-tuple judgement sets across the m individual group members.
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A more plausible solution would be to weaken anonymity. By making some
individuals’ attitudes weightier than those of others, the aggregation function can
deliver complete and consistent attitudes. However, List and Pettit (2011: 53–4)
reject this solution as objectionable for democratic reasons, and especially point
to undesirable epistemic implications, as the group loses access to all the
information that is distributed across the group members.5
The only remaining solution, then, is to weaken systematicity (List and Pettit
2011: 54–8). That means the aggregation function can assign attitudes to the
group that are rejected by most, or even all, of its members insofar as this is
necessary to ensure consistent collective attitudes.6 For example, if the
aggregation result is p, q, ‘¬p ∧ q’, a decision rule that weakens systematicity can
go against the majority and assign ‘p ∧ q’ or ¬p or ¬q to the group.
List and Pettit consider this the most attractive solution to the discursive
dilemma. And since it allows the group to form attitudes that are irreducible to
those of its members, they argue that we cannot explain the group’s behaviour by
looking at the individual level. We must instead detect an intentional pattern at the
level of the group, thus treating the group itself as an agent. This solution to the
discursive dilemma is therefore a crucial step in the defence of group-agent realism.
4. Autonomy
Decision procedures that violate systematicity differ in the ways they correct
inconsistencies in collective attitudes – that is, in how they ensure the group
satisfies the attitude-to-attitude standards. When considering the different
procedures List and Pettit discuss, it will be useful to distinguish between weak
and strong interpretations of these standards. On a weak interpretation, all they
require is that the group forms consistent attitudes. On a strong interpretation,
the standards demand that the group itself be in control of its own attitude
formation, autonomously from its members.
Group-agent realism depends on groups satisfying strong attitude-to-attitude
standards, as group agency will only then be non-redundant in social
explanations. A weak interpretation of these standards is insufficient, as it is
compatible with the group forming complete and consistent attitudes that are
reducible to those of the group members. List and Pettit (2011: 59) have a
strong interpretation in mind when they find a ‘surprising degree of autonomy’
in group agents. And they clearly take group agents to be in control of their
5I show in section 6 how an aggregation function that satisfies anonymity can lead groups to form
obviously false beliefs. This observation could be understood to challenge List and Pettit’s reason for
not weakening anonymity.
6Pettit (2003: 183–4) gives an example where a group adopts a judgement all its members reject. Three
group members vote on three propositions, p, q, and r. They agree that each of these propositions is
necessary and that they are jointly sufficient for a fourth proposition, s (‘(p ∧ q ∧ r) ↔ s’). In Table 2,
we see that a majority of the group members support p, q, and r, but not s. One solution to this
inconsistency problem – the premise-based procedure, which I explain in section 4 – results in the
group forming a judgement of s that all its members reject.
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attitude formation by understanding them to want to hold consistent beliefs and to
pursue consistency in order to satisfy this desire (List and Pettit 2011: 30–1).7
What List (2004) calls ‘functionally inexplicit priority rules’ characterize
decision functions that do not give groups the autonomy they need to meet
strong attitude-to-attitude standards. Such priority rules do not mechanically
give priority to particular propositions but are instead flexible as to which
propositions to prioritize in cases of inconsistency. Pettit actually favours a
functionally inexplicit priority rule by seeing deliberation among the group
members as a good way of dealing with inconsistent aggregation results (Pettit
2007: 512; 2009: 81–8; 2012: 193–4; 2018: 20–1). In the deliberation, the group
members decide collectively how to solve the inconsistency. They receive
information about how others have voted and then deliberate and figure out
how to vote in a second round so as to ensure complete and consistent
collective attitudes. In this procedure, List and Pettit (2011: 61–4) see the group
members not as separate individuals but as parts of a group mind reflecting on
its own attitudes and trying to make them consistent. Tollefsen (2002a: 401),
similarly, understands individuals deliberating in an organisational setting to
adopt not their own personal point of view but that of their organisation.
The flexibility of such a procedure might make it attractive in the absence of good
reasons for prioritising some propositions over others, but it does not justify a kind
of group agency that is non-redundant in social explanations. The outcomes of
deliberation reflect individuals’ strategic bargaining, which is fully accounted for
in eliminativist decision theory: the group adopts the attitudes individual group
members form on the basis of their preferences. We need not ascribe agency to
a group to understand that its members act strategically in response to how
others behave or how they expect others to behave. The deliberative procedure is
therefore the basis for no more than a redundant kind of group agency, as
collective attitudes will be reducible to those of the group members as they
express them within the group structure.
The autonomous group-level reasoning necessary for non-redundant group
agency seems more plausible on the basis of aggregation functions with a
functionally explicit priority rule. Here a mechanism is built into the group’s
constitution so that it adopts attitudes on particular propositions regardless of
the group members’ attitudes towards them. List and Pettit (2011: 56–8) discuss
Table 2. A group forms a judgement all its members reject
p q r (p ∧ q ∧ r) ↔ s s
Member A Yes Yes No Yes No
Member B Yes No Yes Yes No
Member C No Yes Yes Yes No
Group Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
7List (2018) and Pettit (2018) have recently argued that group agents are conscious, since they must be
aware of their own attitudes to ensure their consistency.
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various decision procedures with functionally explicit priority rules (see also
Tollefsen 2002b: 36–9).
First, a ‘premise-based procedure’ assigns the majority attitudes towards the
premises to the group and then the attitude towards the conclusion that follows
whether it conforms to the majority attitude or not (List and Pettit 2011: 56). In
the above example (Table 1), we can see the first two propositions, p and ‘p → q’,
as premises and the third, q, as the conclusion. Table 3 illustrates how a
premise-based procedure corrects an inconsistency in majority judgements. By
adopting the majority judgements that p and that ‘p → q’, the group will
automatically accept q, even though the majority rejects q. In List and Pettit’s
(2011: 58) view, premise-based procedures ‘make the pursuit of agency explicit:
they lead a group to perform in the manner of a reason-driven agent by
deriving its attitudes on conclusions (or ‘posterior’ propositions) from its
attitudes on relevant premises (or ‘prior’ ones)’.
A ‘conclusion-based procedure’ gives priority to the conclusion, so that the
group’s judgements of p and ‘p → q’ must be adjusted if they conflict with the
majority judgement of q. Unlike the premise-based procedure, this procedure
will not always produce a complete set of attitudes, as there might be more than
one way of correcting the group’s judgements of premises (List and Pettit 2011:
126–7). In the example above, the majority rejects q but accepts p and ‘p → q’.
The group can therefore make its judgements consistent by rejecting either or
both of the premises (Table 4). A conclusion-based procedure must therefore be
supplemented by a rule determining how the group is to judge the premises.
List and Pettit (2011: 57) also consider the ‘distance-based aggregation function’.
Collective judgements are here made on the basis of a ‘distance metric’ between
different combinations of attitudes towards the propositions on the agenda. The
Table 3. The group applies the premise-based procedure and accepts q in spite of the majority rejecting q
p p → q q
Member A True True True
Member B True False False
Member C False True False
Group True True False True
Table 4. The conclusion-based procedure. Note that this procedure is indecisive on which of the first two
propositions to reject, as it can reject either of them to achieve consistency at the group level
p p → q q
Member A True True True
Member B True False False
Member C False True False
Group True/False? True/False? False
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complete and consistent set of attitudes with minimal total distance from the
individual judgements is assigned to the group. Like any of the other solutions
List and Pettit propose, distance-based aggregation will attribute the majority
judgements to the group as long as they are consistent. In the above example,
however, this procedure will, like the premise-based procedure, accept the
majority’s judgements of the first two propositions but reject its judgement of
the last one, since the ‘nearest’ consistent attitude set is the one that deviates
from only one individual attitude. This is group member B or C’s attitude
towards q. In some cases, more than one consistent collective attitude set will be
nearest, and the distance-based procedure therefore needs a rule for how to
break such ties.
Crucially, these decision procedures with a functionally explicit priority rule can
produce different collective attitudes on the basis of the same individual attitudes. As
we have just seen, with the same inputs from the group members, the premise-based
and conclusion-based procedures produce different outcomes, and the distance-based
procedure can deliver an outcome that differs from either of them. The same micro-
foundations, in other words, can produce different macro-phenomena. Tollefsen
(2002b: 41) therefore concludes that we must ‘accept the adequacy of macro-level
explanations that appeal to the intentional states of groups’.
Group-agent realists understand these procedures to give groups control over
their own attitude formation, thus satisfying strong attitude-to-attitude
standards. These procedures, List and Pettit (2011: 76) argue, give the group ‘an
important sort of autonomy’. To understand how groups function, we therefore
cannot treat them as mere collections of individuals. We must appreciate that
groups can form their own attitudes and make up their own minds. We need to
recognize how their self-correction mechanisms turn them into reasoning agents
in intentional pursuit of consistent attitudes.
In the rest of this paper, however, I show why procedures with a functionally
explicit priority rule fail to give groups the self-control of autonomous agents.
Individuals can control their groups’ attitudes also under such procedures.
5. Strategic voting
Strategic behaviour can give group members control of their group also under a
decision procedure with a functionally explicit priority rule. Awareness of this
phenomenon requires that we do not treat the group as an agent; we must
instead descend to the individual level of the group members. We must, in other
words, take the physical stance towards the group and look at its physical
components.
This is to take the intentional stance towards these individuals, from which we
see that they act in response to the environment they find themselves in. Within
their group, individuals can be expected to behave differently than outside of
this structure. Among their fellow group members, they are in a strategic
situation and they know it. Particularly, in the situation of collective decision-
making, they know that expressing their attitudes without concern for how
others express their attitudes might be a poor strategy for making the group
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reach the decisions they prefer. How they vote, and, consequently, how the group
forms its attitudes, will therefore depend on this knowledge.8
To appreciate that group members are strategically interacting agents, we must
first recognize that an individual’s attitudes and the attitudes she expresses are
conceptually distinct and might not coincide. In cases of strategic voting, the
two do not coincide. We can expect group members to vote strategically if it will
contribute to bringing about their preferred outcome. Strategic voting on a non-
simple agenda occurs when individuals care more about which attitudes their
group forms towards some propositions than towards others. They give more
importance to their ‘propositions of concern’, to use List and Pettit’s (2011: 112)
terminology. An individual votes strategically by misrepresenting her attitude
towards one or more propositions on the agenda to bring about her desired
outcome.
We shall see how such strategic voting can give the group members control of the
group’s attitude formation, thus eroding the idea of autonomous, non-redundant
group agency. I make this evident by first showing how strategic voters can
ensure the outcomes they prefer regardless of which correction mechanism the
group applies to deal with the inconsistency that would have arisen had they
voted sincerely. Group attitudes are therefore determined by individuals’
preferences, not by any group-level mechanism. While List and Pettit (2011: Ch.
5) are aware of the possibility of strategic voting, they do not recognize its threat
to their group-agent realism (see also List 2004: 505–10; Dietrich and List 2007).
But if we fully appreciate the significance of strategic voting, we shall see why
group-agent realism collapses.
We have seen how the discursive dilemma is said to give rise to autonomous
group agency. Let us now identify three necessary conditions for a discursive
dilemma for any non-simple agenda. The first two concern the set of possible
profiles of group members’ sets of attitudes that result in a discursive dilemma.
First, a majority of group members cannot have consistently positive or negative
attitudes towards all the propositions on the agenda. In the above example,
members B and C ensure that their group meets this condition by supporting
one proposition while rejecting the other two. If, on the other hand, a majority
of group members have consistently positive or consistently negative attitudes,
there cannot be majority support for an inconsistent set of attitudes. This is
because we get unidimensional alignment, where each individual can be
positioned on the left or the right side of a spectrum for every proposition, so
that the majority attitudes towards the propositions on the agenda corresponds
with the complete and consistent attitudes of the median individual (List 2003).
Second, within the subgroup of members with a combination of positive and
negative attitudes, there can be no majority of members with the same set of
8Such strategic behaviour does not conflict with Bacharach’s (1999) understanding of ‘team reasoning’,
where a group member works out what an imaginary coordinator would require her or him to do as part of a
team doing what is best for all its members. Nor is there a conflict with Tuomela’s (2013: esp. Ch. 7) very
similar account of ‘we-mode reasoning’, which is the consideration of how to contribute to an outcome that
best satisfies one’s group’s preferences. Group members might vote strategically based on what they consider
best for their group as much as on what they believe is best for themselves. In fact, strategic voting in the
cases I consider contributes to outcomes favoured by a majority of group members.
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attitudes.Group members can vote strategically based on one If, however, a majority
of the members of this subgroup hold the same set of attitudes, we again get
unidimensionality and these members will be decisive.
These two conditions concerning the group members’ attitudes are not sufficient
for a discursive dilemma, since we also need a motivational condition to hold.
Specifically, the group members with a combination of positive and negative
attitudes must express their attitudes truthfully. They must be epistemically
motivated, meaning they want their group to adopt the judgements they believe
to be true. The more epistemically motivated voters are, the more likely they are
to vote truthfully, even when strategic voting will produce their desired outcome.
We can therefore see that group-agent realism depends on epistemically
motivated group members. It is this sincerity condition I challenge by showing
how group members have an incentive to misrepresent their attitudes.
Group members can vote strategically based on one of two kinds of preference
orientation (Dietrich and List 2007: 289–91). They have reason-oriented preferences
if their propositions of concern are those identified as reasons, or premises, for the
proposition identified as the outcome, or conclusion. They have outcome-oriented
preferences if their proposition of concern is the outcome, or conclusion. Whenever
the first two conditions for the discursive dilemma hold, the voters with a
combination of positive and negative attitudes have an incentive to vote
strategically, and thus undermine the third condition, insofar as they have
reason-oriented or outcome-oriented preferences. C in the above example
believes that ¬p, ‘p → q’, and ¬q. If C has outcome-oriented preferences, she
votes strategically by voting against ‘p → q’, since contributing to majority
opposition to ‘p → q’ makes her group form attitudes consistent with rejecting
q. By voting consistently against each proposition, C cannot contribute to any
other outcome than ¬q. Strategic voting is thus meant to ensure that the
collective attitude formation be determined by the individual’s preference
orientation rather than by the group’s decision rule.
To further clarify the conditions for strategic voting and to show how it puts
individuals in control of the collective attitude formation, I begin with an
example. A committee consisting of three members will decide by majority
voting whether or not to give a junior academic, J, tenure.9 The committee must
give reasons for its decision and therefore bases it on collective judgements of
whether J is (a) a good researcher and (b) a good teacher. The three committee
members agree that each of these two conditions is necessary and that they are
jointly sufficient for the decision to (c) award J tenure (c ↔ (a ∧ b)). To make
the case relevant to the question of group agency, let us assume that the
committee members hold complete and consistent beliefs about the three
propositions and that expressing their judgements according to these beliefs will
generate inconsistent majority judgements. Table 5 shows how the majority
judgements will be inconsistent if the committee members vote truthfully.
9Dietrich and List (2007) also use the tenure committee example, but I extend it here to illustrate the
significance of strategic voting.
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I assume the voters know howmany others vote for or against each proposition.10
They also know that if the committee members vote sincerely, the resulting
inconsistency will be resolved by one of the correction rules introduced in the
previous section. Sincerity is a dominant strategy for members with consistently
positive or negative attitudes towards all propositions on the agenda (except the
connective proposition, ‘c ↔ (a ∧ b)’, which all members must accept for the
possibility of the discursive dilemma), regardless of preference orientation and
decision rule. This is the case for A in the tenure committee example. Members
with a combination of both positive and negative attitudes, however, such as B
and C, might vote strategically if they attach greater importance to some
propositions than to others, as we shall see below.
To demonstrate how strategic voting makes collective decision-making
dependent on individuals’ preferences instead of the group’s correction mechanism,
I shall compare how the committee members vote if they have reason-oriented
preferences with how they vote if they have outcome-oriented preferences. I do so
under each of the three procedures with functionally explicit priority rules I
introduced in the previous section. We shall see that by voting strategically based
on preference orientation, the members will ensure the same consistent set of
collective attitudes regardless of decision rule. What determines the outcome is
therefore not the decision rule but the members’ preference orientation.
I first suppose that the committee employs the premise-based procedure. If the
committee members vote truthfully, the committee will accept a and b and go
against the majority by accepting c. With reason-oriented preferences, group
members have no incentive to vote untruthfully when the group employs the
premise-based procedure (Dietrich and List 2007: 290). With this procedure, the
committee adopts its members’ collective judgements of the premises and will
reject the majority judgement of the conclusion if it conflicts with the collective
judgements of the premises. The members therefore have no incentive to vote
strategically insofar as they have reason-oriented preferences.
If they have outcome-oriented preferences, on the other hand, the premise-based
procedure does incentivize strategic voting. In Table 5, we see that committee
member B does not believe that c is the case, but she believes that a is the case.
Table 5. Three committee members’ beliefs about propositions relevant to whether or not a junior
academic ought to be given tenure
a b c ↔ (a ∧ b) c
Member A Yes Yes Yes Yes
Member B Yes No Yes No
Member C No Yes Yes No
Majority Yes Yes Yes No
10Attributing to each voter knowledge of other voters’ attitudes is common in analyses of strategic voting.
Cox (1997: 78–9), for example, uses such knowledge as a mechanism underlying Duverger’s law, which says
plurality systems are always two-party systems, since people will not vote for a candidate who will end up
third in a plurality-rule election.
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B consequently accepts only one necessary condition for c, and rejects the other one,
b. If B has outcome-oriented preferences and he knows that the committee’s
judgement of c will be whatever follows from the majority judgements of a and
b, then B will misrepresent his positive belief of a to make sure the committee
rejects c. Likewise, if C, who also rejects c, has outcome-oriented preferences, she
has an incentive to misrepresent her belief about b. B and C’s strategic voting
thus ensures that the committee consistently adopts their negative judgement of
c on the basis of their knowledge that the group will apply the premise-based
procedure in the case of an inconsistency (Table 6). The general point here is
that outcome-oriented group members will vote on the premises in whatever
way necessary to make the group’s judgements coherent with their desired
judgement of the conclusion (Ferejohn 2007: 133–4).
Let us now instead assume that the committee employs the conclusion-based
procedure, which means the committee members vote directly on c. In this case,
committee members with outcome-oriented preferences will vote truthfully on c.
The committee’s conclusion is therefore the same under the premise-based and
conclusion-procedures when the members have outcome-oriented preferences.
Generally, if group members have outcome-oriented preferences, the premise-
based and conclusion-based procedures will generate identical collective
judgements on the conclusion (Dietrich and List 2007: 290–1).11
If the committee members have reason-oriented preferences, on the other hand,
the conclusion-based procedure will incentivize untruthful voting. B and C will
misrepresent their beliefs of c to ensure the committee adopts their beliefs about
the premises, a and b. Their strategic voting will then lead the committee to
accept all the propositions on the agenda (Table 7). This was also the result we
got with the premise-based procedure on the condition that the committee
members have reason-oriented preferences. So, we see that the premise-based
and conclusion-based procedures will produce the same set of collective
judgements also if the committee members have outcome-oriented preferences.
The distance-based procedure also conforms to this pattern. If the committee
members have reason-oriented preferences, B and C have an incentive to
misrepresent their beliefs of c in order to ensure minimal distance to a collective
Table 6. Committee members with outcome-oriented preferences express their judgements when the
committee will apply the premise-based procedure in response to an inconsistency
a b c ↔ (a ∧ b) c
Member A Yes Yes Yes Yes
Member B Yes No No Yes No
Member C No Yes No Yes No
Majority Yes No Yes No Yes No
11As Dietrich and List (2007: 292) conclude, this observation questions the view common in the
deliberative democracy literature that the premise-based procedure is superior to the conclusion-based
solution for epistemic reasons.
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judgement set compatible with their beliefs of a and b. And if they have outcome-
oriented preferences, they have an incentive to misrepresent their beliefs of a and
b to ensure minimal distance to a collective judgement set compatible with their
beliefs of c. In this example, the result of such strategic voting will be no distance
at all to B and C’s desired outcome, as there will be no inconsistency for the
group to deal with. We have just seen that we get the same result with the
premise-based and conclusion-based procedures. By voting strategically, then, the
committee members remain in control of the committee’s judgements regardless
of decision procedure (Table 8).
In each scenario above, the committee members have the same preference
orientation; they have either all reason-oriented or all outcome-oriented preferences.
However, their strategic voting will ensure consistency also if some have reason-
oriented preferences and others have outcome-oriented preferences. This is so
because at least two of the three members will then have consistently positive or
consistently negative attitudes towards the propositions on the agenda. When B and
C strategically vote consistently for or against the propositions on the agenda, they
will ensure consistently positive or negative majority judgements either by combining
with A or with each other. The same would hold if A had consistently negative attitudes.
Generally, in any group of three or more members, where the first two conditions
for the discursive dilemma hold, so that a majority of the members do not hold
consistently positive or consistently negative attitudes, and no majority in this
subgroup hold the same attitudes, group members will vote strategically to ensure
consistent collective attitudes insofar as they have either reason-oriented or
outcome-oriented preferences. The case for autonomous group agency therefore
depends on these group members having neither reason-oriented nor outcome-
oriented preferences, and therefore no incentive to vote strategically. In all other
cases, collective decision making over a non-simple agenda will depend not on the
decision rule employed but on the members’ preference orientation. Group-agent
Table 7. Committee members with reason-oriented preferences express their judgements when the
committee will apply the conclusion-based procedure in response to an inconsistency
a b c ↔ (a ∧ b) c
Member A Yes Yes Yes Yes
Member B Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Member C No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Majority Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Table 8. The outcomes of each procedure under different assumptions about group members’
preference orientations
Reason-oriented preferences Outcome-oriented preferences
Premise-based procedure a, b, c ¬(a ∧ b), ¬c
Conclusion-based procedure a, b, c ¬(a ∧ b), ¬c
Distance-based procedure a, b, c ¬(a ∧ b), ¬c
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realists must therefore show why we should expect sincere voting. In sections 7 and 8,
I consider different attempts at making sincerity incentive-compatible.
6. Breaking patterns
While the strategic voting discussed in the previous section weakens the autonomy
and non-redundancy of group agency, it does not challenge groups’ ability to satisfy
weak attitude-to-attitude standards. After all, strategic voting does not jeopardize
the consistency of collective attitudes. However, as I have also argued elsewhere,
strategic voting can pose a further problem that can undermine groups’ agency,
not just their autonomy (Moen 2019).
From the intentional stance, we look for patterns not just of consistency but also
of factuality. We expect the system in focus to form true beliefs based on the
evidence it gathers from scanning its environment. We take the system to adopt
the belief that p only if p is the best, or most predictive, interpretation of the
matter given the available evidence (Dennett 1987: 29). An unreliable truth-
tracker, however, is unpredictable from the intentional stance, and therefore not
an agent. This condition for agency is expressed in List and Pettit’s (2011: 36–7)
attitude-to-fact standards of rationality (see also Tollefsen 2002a: 399–400). We
have seen how group members might have an incentive to express judgements
they believe to be false. We shall now see how this could make their group
uninterpretable from the intentional stance.
Group members, List and Pettit (2011: 36) write, are their group’s ‘eyes and ears’,
as they provide it with information about the world. When they vote in favour of p,
the group treats that as evidence for p, just as perceptual input is evidence for an
individual. But this view is distorted by the observation that group members might
deliberately misinform their group about the world. When group members vote
strategically, they express an attitude they believe to be false. In the cases I have
considered so far, any proposition is always believed by at least one individual.
These cases therefore suggest the problem of false belief formation is no greater
at the group level than at the individual level. But if the group members lack
complete information of others’ attitudes, there can be outcomes where the
group forms an attitude with which all the group members disagree.12 In such
situations, strategic voting problematizes group-agent realists’ attribution of
predictive patterns of generally true beliefs to groups.
Let us consider an example where strategic voting generates a false negative. In
this example, a political party is making a policy decision and will employ the
premise-based procedure in the case of an inconsistency. On the basis of their
outcome-oriented preferences, the party members deny an obviously true
proposition in order to ensure that their party collectively has reasons in support
of their desired policy decision. Each of the three party members votes on the
following propositions:
12For an account of strategic voting under conditions of uncertainty of others’ attitudes, see Clough
(2007).
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• p: Greenhouse gas emissions cause global warming.
• q: Reducing greenhouse gas emissions will not harm the economy.
• r: Reducing greenhouse gas emissions will not intolerably infringe on
individual liberty.
• (p ∧ q ∧ r) → s: If p, q, and r, then the party should support policies to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.
• s: The party should support policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
All the party members believe p, but since B and C reject s, they have an incentive to
vote against p, as well as q and r, to ensure the party makes their desired decision.
The result is that the party forms a belief of p that all its members believe to be false
(Table 9).
A failure to assess relevant information to form true beliefs indicates that the
group has malfunctioned, at least from the perspective of the intentional stance.
But any human agent occasionally also forms false beliefs. If infallibility were a
requirement for agency, there would be no human agents. We can, however,
attribute false beliefs to a system from the intentional stance, but then, as Dennett
(1987: 49) writes, ‘special stories must be told to explain how the error resulted
from the presence of features in the environment that are deceptive relative to the
perceptual capacities of the system’. We should look for something in the system’s
environment that can explain the false belief. For example, gathering relevant
information might have been costly, and the system was therefore understandably
trying to operate on the limited information it had (Dennett 1987: 96–7). No such
explanations are possible, however, when groups form false judgements due to
group members strategically misrepresenting their beliefs. The issue may be
obvious and the relevant evidence easily accessible, but the group nonetheless fails
to form the correct belief.
When a system functions in a way uninterpretable from the intentional stance,
we must descend to the physical stance. Only from the physical stance are we aware
of any faults that prevent the system from functioning as a rational agent. As
Dennett (1971: 89) notes, ‘the physical stance is generally reserved for instances
of breakdown, where the condition preventing normal operation is generalized
and easily locatable’. To make sense of a group’s failure to form true beliefs due
to its members’ strategic voting, we cannot view it as an irreducible agent. Only
by looking at the group members and their attitudes can we make sense of the
group’s failure to form true beliefs.
Table 9. A political party rejects a proposition all its members believe is true, as a result of members
voting strategically on the basis of their outcome-oriented preferences
p q r (p ∧ q ∧ r) → s s
Member A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Member B Yes No No Yes No Yes No
Member C Yes No Yes No No Yes No
Majority Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
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From the physical stance, we are aware of the different physical make-ups of
groups and individuals. Crucially, groups, unlike individuals, consist of
strategically interacting agents, and this is what makes them vulnerable to false
belief formation in a way individuals are not. They do not just form false beliefs
because their human members are imperfect truth-trackers, but also because
their human constituents may intentionally feed false judgements into the
aggregation function. To explain and predict the group’s behaviour, then, we
should descend to the level of the group members and consider their reasons for
misrepresenting their beliefs. Only then can we make sense of the group’s
malfunctioning: its members have strategically misrepresented their beliefs. And
by descending to the physical stance to understand the group’s behaviour, we
disqualify it as an agent.
Of course, strategic voting will not always make the group form false beliefs.
However, the cases where strategic voting does lead the group to false belief
formation illuminate a potential problem applying only to groups, and not to
individuals. The group members’ strategic behaviour weakens their group’s
capacity to form true belief, thus making it less interpretable from the intentional
stance. It becomes harder to detect an intentional pattern that can reliably predict
the group’s behaviour, and therefore less plausible to treat it as an agent.
7. Strategy-proofness
The last two sections have revealed how group members can undermine group
agency by misrepresenting their attitudes to make their group adopt their
attitude towards their proposition of concern. The challenge for group-agent
realists, then, is to explain how group members can be motivated to vote
truthfully, so that groups can be interpreted as autonomous agents. They must
show how sincerity can be made incentive-compatible.
One way of disincentivizing strategic voting would be to introduce a strategy-
proof aggregation function. Strategy-proofness is a game-theoretic concept we can
understand by first seeing the aggregation function as a game form with the
individual voters as the players (Gibbard 1973). In the case of attitude aggregation
over a set of propositions, the players’ possible actions are all the different attitude
sets they can submit to the aggregation function (Dietrich and List 2007). By
assigning payoffs for each player to the different possible outcomes, we have
modelled the situation as a game. Which strategies the players pursue determines
each player’s payoffs.
Strategy-proofness depends on truthfulness being a weakly dominant strategy –
that is, no player gets a higher payoff by voting untruthfully regardless of what the
other players do. More precisely, an attitude aggregation function is strategy-proof
for any individual, for any profile, and for any preference relation, when each
individual weakly prefers the outcome following sincere voting to any possible
outcome resulting from misrepresenting her or his attitudes (Dietrich and List
2007: 287). Notice that whether an aggregation function is strategy-proof
depends on motivational assumptions. All else being equal, strategy-proofness is
easier to achieve the stronger the individuals’ preference for truthfulness is.
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Dietrich and List (2007) distinguish strategy-proofness frommanipulability, which is
not a game-theoretic concept and does not depend on individuals’ preferences. An
aggregation function is manipulable if and only if there is a logical possibility of a
profile such that a player can alter the outcome by voting untruthfully. An
aggregation function can therefore be manipulable but nonetheless strategy-proof if
voting truthfully is each player’s dominant strategy. Non-manipulability is therefore
a more demanding condition than is strategy-proofness.
The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem proves the general impossibility of a non-
manipulable and non-dictatorial aggregation function with at least three possible
outcomes (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975). Dietrich and List (2007: 282)
extend this result to attitude aggregation to prove that on a non-simple agenda,
an aggregation function can satisfy universal domain, collective rationality,
responsiveness,13 and non-manipulability if and only if it is a dictatorship of
some individual. We saw in section 3 why List and Pettit will not weaken
collective rationality or universal domain. And a dictatorial procedure, in
addition to its other unattractive features, is obviously no solution for group-
agent realism, since the group’s attitudes will then be reducible to those of a
single individual. Dietrich and List (2007: 283) also refrain from weakening
responsiveness, as that would imply a degenerate aggregation rule. Consequently,
the aggregation function must be manipulable.
However, group-agent realism does not depend on a non-manipulable
aggregation function. A strategy-proof one will do, since it makes the group
members’ preferences for the group to adopt their attitude towards each
proposition on the agenda stronger than any other preference they might have.
It will thus solve the whole problem of strategic voting. The key question is
therefore under what conditions group members will be motivated to vote
truthfully. Dietrich and List (2007: 280–3) show that an aggregation rule is
strategy-proof whenever the following two conditions are satisfied
simultaneously (quoted from List and Pettit 2011: 112–13):
Independence on the propositions of concern. The group attitude on each
proposition of concern – but not on other propositions – should depend
only on the individuals’ attitudes towards it (and not on individual attitudes
towards other propositions).
Monotonicity on the propositions of concern. [A] positive group attitude on
any proposition in that set never changes into a negative one if some
individuals rejecting it change their attitudes towards accepting it.
Simple majority voting satisfies both conditions, as it requires that a collective
judgement of a proposition depends only on the majority judgement of that
proposition. The problem with majority voting, as we have seen, is that it
violates collective rationality. On a non-simple agenda, majority attitudes might
13Responsiveness: For any admissible profile, if one or more voters change their votes in one direction,
while all other votes remain unchanged, the collective decision cannot change in the opposite direction.
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be inconsistent. List and Pettit therefore reject simple majoritarianism and opt for
an aggregation function that satisfies collective rationality but violates systematicity.
But to weaken systematicity is to weaken the attitude-aggregation version of Arrow’s
(1963) independence of irrelevant alternatives condition: the collective attitude
towards each proposition on the agenda is to be determined strictly on the basis
of the group members’ attitudes towards that proposition and no other
proposition.14 To follow List and Pettit in relaxing systematicity is to allow for
an aggregation function that rejects this independence condition by adopting
collective attitudes towards some propositions on the basis of their connection to
other propositions.
The conditions relevant for strategy-proofness, however, are independence and
monotonicity on the propositions of concern. By specifying which propositions can
be of the group members’ concern, the aggregation function can satisfy both of these
conditions as well as universal domain, collective rationality, and anonymity. The
solution, in other words, is to make sure the group members hold preferences
towards the propositions on the agenda so that they have no incentive to vote
strategically. They will consequently vote on each proposition as if it were
logically separate from any other proposition, which means voting on each
proposition as if there were only two possible outcomes. By thus not seeing the
propositions on the agenda as connected, they will have no reason for voting
strategically. Ensuring strategy-proofness, then, means motivating sincerity.
8. Motivating sincerity
List and Pettit (2011: 113–14, 124–8) discuss two ways of making truthfulness
incentive-compatible. The first is to assume that the group members’ preferences
are fixed and then apply an aggregation procedure that satisfies both
independence and monotonicity of the propositions of concern. This works with
both premise-based and conclusion-based procedures, they explain, ‘[i]n the
lucky scenario in which the propositions of concern are mutually independent
and fit to serve either as premises or as conclusions’ (List and Pettit 2011: 113).
If the group members all have outcome-oriented preferences, and the
proposition of concern therefore is the conclusion, then the conclusion-based
procedure will meet the two conditions and be strategy-proof. The same holds
for the premise-based procedure if the group members’ preferences are reason-
oriented, so that the premises are the propositions of concern.
As we saw in section 5, however, truthful voting under these conditions does not
strengthen the case for group-agent realism, since the individuals remain in control
of the collective attitude formation. That is, the outcome is the same regardless of
which collective decision function is employed. So, while List and Pettit’s first way of
14Independence of irrelevant alternatives is one of the components that make up the systematicity
condition. The other component is a version of May’s (1952: 681–2) ‘neutrality’ condition, according to
which the pattern of dependence between individual and collective attitudes will be the same for all
propositions on the agenda. Changing the order of the propositions will then not change the result.
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ensuring truthfulness will work insofar as the condition of fixed preferences holds, it
cannot respond to the problems strategic voting poses for group-agent realism.
Furthermore, Dietrich and List (2007: 281–3) show that when individuals’
preferences are not fixed, so that they do not all share the same proposition, or
propositions, of concern, the only aggregation functions satisfying monotonicity
and independence on the propositions of concern are degenerate ones that
violate either the condition of non-dictatorship or unanimity preservation.
The other solution List and Pettit (2011: 113) propose is to ‘try to change the
individuals’ preferences by persuading or convincing them that they should care
about a different set of propositions of concern’. In connection to the first
solution, List and Pettit note that by making individuals’ preferences reason-
oriented, we can apply the premise-based procedure to make truthfulness a
dominant strategy for each individual. In the tenure committee, for example, the
problem of strategic voting in response to the premise-based procedure is due to
the committee members having outcome-oriented preferences. But if we can
make their preferences reason-oriented, they will have no incentive to vote
strategically. B will have no incentive to vote untruthfully on a, since he wants
the committee to adopt his belief that a is the case. And C will have no
incentive to vote untruthfully on b, since she wants the committee to adopt her
view that b is the case. Like the first solution, however, this second solution
implies that the individuals’ preferences, and not the group’s correction
mechanism, will determine the group’s attitude.
Another version of this second solution of changing individuals’ preferences is to
simply make the group members prefer honesty – that is, expressing their attitudes
towards each proposition truthfully with no special consideration for any
proposition of concern. If successful, this approach achieves strategy-proofness
and the group members will not attempt to prevent collective-level inconsistencies.
Which attitudes the group adopts will then depend on which correction mechanism
it applies, and the group will be in control of its own attitude formation in the way
group-agent realists suggest. Making sense of how the group functions will then
require us to treat it as an agent.
The obvious problem here is how to actually change individuals’ preferences in
this manner. List and Pettit (2011: 127–8) also admit to having difficulties seeing
how to make individuals adopt the right kind of preference. They suggest trying to
create a social ethos under which people approve of one another’s truthfulness and
disapprove of each other’s strategic voting. Truthfulness will then be an equilibrium
strategy on the assumption that people want each other’s approval and that they will
get it by voting sincerely.15
This solution can only work under three conditions. First, individuals’ sincere
attitudes must be common knowledge. In section 6, I assume voters have
knowledge of the aggregate support for or opposition to each proposition on the
agenda. This common knowledge condition, however, is different and more
demanding, as the group members must know not just how many others
support or reject a proposition, but also the attitudes of each particular voter.
15This idea is based on Brennan and Pettit (2004).
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They also know that others have this information and that others know that they
have this information. Second, the individuals want to gain each other’s approval
and to avoid each other’s disapproval. While this condition seems realistic, at
least in groups whose members frequently interact, the third is less prevalent.
This is the condition that individuals actually receive approval for expressing
their attitudes truthfully and disapproval for expressing attitudes untruthfully. In
my examples above, this condition does not seem to hold, as a majority of the
group members vote strategically. It is also unlikely when the strategic voting
leads to an outcome most members desire, as in the political party example in
section 6.
Without a plausible mechanism showing why individuals will be motivated to
vote sincerely, individuals cannot be expected to behave as the group agency
model predicts. Group-agent realists have not provided such a mechanism,
however, and therefore lack grounds for arguing that group agents are non-
redundant in social explanations.
9. Conclusion
Group-agent realists reject eliminativism for failing to capture how groups can
reliably form attitudes that are irreducible to those of their individual members.
To appreciate this phenomenon, they argue, we must treat groups as agents in
their own right. They base this argument on the observation that aggregating
individuals’ complete and consistent attitudes towards a set of interconnected
propositions can produce inconsistent collective attitudes. To reliably form
consistent attitudes, the group must therefore have the capacity to form attitudes
that are not held by a majority of their members. Group-agent realists
understand this as the capacity of a reasoning group mind that reflects on the
inputs from the group members and accepts them only if they are consistent. In
this process, groups might form different sets of attitudes based on the same
profile of the group members’ attitudes. To make sense of this phenomenon,
group-agent realists argue, we cannot look at the individual level, as
eliminativism suggests. We must instead take the step up to the collective level
and treat the group as an agent in its own right.
In this paper, I have highlighted a fatal problem in the micro-foundations of
group-agent realism. By fully appreciating that groups consist of strategically
interacting agents, we can see why we cannot expect groups to function in the
way group-agent realism predicts. Collective-level inconsistency depends on a
majority of group members voting sincerely when reason-oriented or outcome-
oriented preferences will motivate them to vote strategically. Group-agent realism
depends on a mechanism showing why we can expect truthful voting from such
individuals, since strategic voting will make the decision-making dependent on
group members’ preferences rather than on the group’s decision procedure.
However, group-agent realists have provided no such mechanism. And if they
cannot show why group members should not be expected to vote strategically, we
are better off eliminating group agency, as we can then appreciate the significant
impact of individuals’ preferences on how groups function.
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